A new report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a nonpartisan watchdog that reviews government operations for Congress, reveals problems with the construction of the new submarines.

The GAO noted that both cost and schedule targets for the lead submarine have been consistently missed, according to the report released Monday. Gizmodo reported.

“Our independent analysis calculated likely cost overruns more than six times higher than Electric Boat’s estimates and nearly five times higher than the Navy’s. As a result, the government could be responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars in additional construction costs for the lead submarine,” the GAO said in its report.

The Navy plans to replace its aging Ohio-class submarines

The country’s nuclear weapons are deployed in three ways: intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from silos, bombs dropped by strategic bombers and missiles fired from stealth submarines.

This combination, known as the nuclear triad, is essential to national defense. Of the three, submarines are the most critical for their stealth capabilities, making them virtually impossible to detect and capable of carrying enough nuclear warheads to level entire cities.

The Ohio-class submarines, built in the 1960s and 1970s and first deployed in 1981, are aging and maintenance costs are rising annually. The Navy proposed replacing them with more advanced Columbia-class submarines, aiming to launch by 2027 at an estimated cost of $9 billion each for a fleet of 12.

General Dynamics Electric Boat is currently building the first Columbia-class submarine, but the construction faces major challenges. According to the GAO report, the program faces persistent problems such as delays in materials and design products, despite efforts over the years to address these issues. The report also stated that rapid and substantial action is needed to improve construction performance.

Submarine construction faces a shortage of skilled labor

Some of the problems are systemic, as there are few skilled workers in the US who can build nuclear submarines. Between the 1980s and 2020, the number of submarine suppliers providing critical parts and materials has been drastically reduced from around 17,000 suppliers to just 3,500.

This has led Columbia-class shipbuilders to become increasingly dependent on single-source suppliers, limiting competition for contracts, the GAO said.

If Defense One writes that the Navy and shipbuilders are providing “supplier development financing” to support these critical suppliers. This funding is divided into two categories: ‘direct investments in suppliers’, which cover expenses such as equipment, factory upgrades and workforce development, and ‘specialized purchases to signal demand’, where orders are placed to ensure suppliers are capable and motivated continue to produce even if their products are not immediately needed.

However, the GAO found that the Navy has not adequately assessed whether its financial investments in the supplier base are being effectively utilized. The GAO report outlined that the Navy has inconsistently defined the necessary information to evaluate whether these investments led to increased production or cost savings and how these results align with the program’s objectives.